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Abstract— For improving the throughput while simultane-
ously enhancing the security in aeronautical ad-hoc networking
(AANET), a channel quality indicator (CQI)-mapped spatially
modulated sparse code multiple access (SM-SCMA) scheme is
proposed in this paper. On one hand, we exploit the joint benefits
of spatial modulation and SCMA for boosting the data rate. On
the other hand, a physical-layer secret key is generated by varying
the SM-SCMA mapping patterns based on the instantaneous CQI
in the desired link. This guarantees the security of AANETs,
since this secret key is not exchanged between the source
aeroplane and its destination. Due to the line-of-sight (LoS)
propagation in the AANET, other aeroplanes or eavesdroppers
may detect the signals delivered in the desired link. However,
they are unable to translate the detected signals into the original
confidential information, even if multiple copies of the signals are
recoined over multiple hops of the AANET, because they have
no knowledge of the CQI-based SM-SCMA mapping pattern.
The performance of the CQI-mapped SM-SCMA is evaluated in
terms of both its bit error rate and its ergodic secrecy rate, which
substantiates that the proposed scheme secures the confidential
information exchange in the multi-hop AANET.
Index Terms— Aeronautical ad-hoc networking (AANET),
physical layer security (PLS), sparse code multiple access
(SCMA), spatial modulation (SM).
I. INTRODUCTION
As an attractive large-scale multi-hop wireless architecture,
the concept of aeronautical ad-hoc networking (AANET)
has been developed relying on multi-hop aircraft-to-aircraft
(A2A) communications [1], [2]. This concept extends the
coverage of wireless networks purely relying on air-to-ground
communications, as well as allowing aeroplanes to assist each
other in forwarding information when en-route. In practice,
we can enhance the network’s performance by exploiting that
in many practical scenarios passenger aircrafts follow semi-
deterministic routes [3]. This is particularly so for example
in Trans-Atlantic scenarios, where the planes follow each other
along the same flight-path at a similar velocity. This makes the
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Doppler shift in A2A communications much smaller than that
in air-to-ground communications, since the relative velocity
between a pair of aeroplanes, specifically in the same cruising
direction, is much lower than that between an aeroplane and a
ground station. Thanks to the longer coherence time associated
with the smaller Doppler spread in A2A communications, the
time-division duplex (TDD) mode can be exploited in the
AANET to boost the resource utilisation efficiency [4].
Two major challenges in the AANET are: (i) to provide
hundreds of passengers in the cabin with fast Internet access,
which requires extremely high throughput in the A2A links;
and (ii) to guarantee the security of control networks and
Internet connectivity in the wireless communications at a high
risk of data breaches, concerning the leakage of information
delivered in an A2A link to the other aeroplanes or eaves-
droppers due to the broadcast nature of strong line-of-sight
(LoS) propagation [5] associated with multiple plane-to-plane
transmissions.
Traditional network security relies on upper-layer encryp-
tion for the confidentiality and authenticity of communica-
tions. However, the higher-layer secret key exchange requires
extra communication resources, thereby reducing the through-
put. Moreover, the cryptographic technologies implemented
at the upper layers are not suitable for the high-dynamic
infrastructure of the AANET, where communications over
the A2A links can be guaranteed by physical layer security
(PLS). Compared to traditional network security, PLS has a
number of merits. Firstly, the inherent random characteristics
of wireless channels is exploited to guarantee information
confidentiality [6]–[8]. Since the third parties have no knowl-
edge of the legitimate channel state information (CSI), they
cannot decode the confidential information. Secondly, the third
parties’ channels are degraded in the PLS mechanism, by
beamforming [9]–[11], artificial noise [12], jamming [13]–
[15] or cooperative relaying [16], [17]. Furthermore, PLS
techniques avoid wasteful signal processing routinely required
for upper-layer secret key exchange, therefore boosting the
resource utilisation efficiency. Finally, PLS is also compatible
with upper-layer encryption required for ultimate security.
Against this backdrop, the PLS mechanism is exploited
for enhancing the security of AANETs while simultaneously
improving both the resource utilisation efficiency and the
throughput [18], [19]. In particular, the spatial-domain re-
sources formed by multi-antenna configurations are exploited
for conceiving spatial modulation (SM) assisted PLS [20].
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TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE.
Contributions This work [21], [22] [23] [24] [25] [29] [30]-[32] [39]-[42]
Aeronautical Ad-hoc Networking (AANET) X
Multi-hop networks X
Physical Layer Security (PLS) X X X X X X
Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) X X X X
Spatial Modulation (SM) X X X X X X X
CQI-based Bit-to-Symbol Mapping X X
Multi-Carrier (MC) Transmissions X X
In this context, Wu et al. [21], [22] proposed a precoding-
aided SM scheme for secrecy communications in by jointly
maximizing the signal power at the desired receiver and
minimizing the power received at the eavesdropper. Wang et
al. [23] adopted jamming techniques for improving the secrecy
rate of secure SM communications. A design alternative for
increasing the secrecy rate of SM-assisted PLS was proposed
in [24] by relying on transmit antenna (TA) selection, which
further reduces the number of radio frequency (RF) chains
required by the SM configurations.
Although these solutions may guarantee secure communi-
cations, they are not so suitable for enhancing the PLS of
AANETs since they rely on the knowledge of the wiretap-
ping CSI for degrading the wiretapper link. In the AANET,
to obtain the CSI of third parties would require excessive
extra communication resources. Moreover, the strong LoS
propagation of the A2A links facilitates the third parties’
wiretapping and it would require quite a high power to jam the
eavesdroppers. A physical-layer secret key generation method
was proposed in [25] for enhancing the PLS by degrading the
eavesdroppers’ detection quality without requiring the wiretap-
per’s CSI. Motivated by this, we develop a mapping-aided SM-
assisted PLS solution for AANETs. The SM mapping patterns
are varied according to the instantaneous channel quality
indicator (CQI) of the link spanning from the transmitter to the
desired receiver, which are used as the secret key. Given the
channel reciprocity of the TDD mode considered, the CQI is
not transmitted in the feedback channel. Since the third parties
cannot obtain the CQI of the desired link, they have no basis
for decoding the confidential information, even if they can
detect the signals transmitted over this link. Our solution is
ideally suited for AANETs.
In parallel with the advances of PLS in the AANET,
increasing the data rate of A2A links is our second main
objective. One approach is to adopt multiple transmit antennas,
as investigated in [26], [27]. An alternative solution is em-
ploying non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) techniques
[28], where multiple data streams are conveyed by a single
orthogonal resource. The investigations of various NOMA
schemes in combination with SM have demonstrated promis-
ing complexity reductions compared to the conventional multi-
antenna NOMA systems, mainly owing to the reduced number
of RF chains. In [29], Wang et al. investigated a general
NOMA scheme relying on SM for downlink transmission. As
a further advance, Liu et al. [30]–[32] adopted a code-domain
NOMA technique, i.e., sparse-code multiple access (SCMA)
[33], and amalgamated with SM for conceiving SM-SCMA
for supporting the heavily loaded Internet-of-Things. Low
complexity detection algorithms proposed in [34], [35] further
facilitate the potential application of SM-SCMA schemes in
AANETs. In [36], a cooperative SM-NOMA scheme was in-
troduced into vehicle-to-vehicle networks and its performance
was investigated. The benefits of SM-NOMA may also be
combined with those of ad-hoc networks, where low latency is
required, despite the impediments of multi-hop transmissions
[37], [38]. To improve the security performance, several PLS
techniques have been investigated in NOMA systems [39]–
[42]. However, there is a paucity in literature on the PLS of
SM-NOMA systems, especially in the AANET context.
Against this background, we propose a CQI-mapped SM-
SCMA scheme for enhancing the PLS of multi-hop AANETs.
The novelty of our work is boldly and explicitly compared
to the state-of-the-art in Table I at a glance. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We propose a CQI-mapped SM-SCMA scheme for
achieving high throughput, while enhancing the PLS
in multihop AANETs, where the SM-SCMA mapping
pattern is varied according to the instantaneous CQI
of the desired link, which is then used as a physical-
layer secret key. Since the SM and SCMA are directly
selected according to the instantaneous CQI, no extra
computations are required for obtaining the secret key.
Additionally, the proposed scheme achieves a high data
rate by transmitting multiple data streams through a single
resource and by conveying extra information through the
TA index.
• The specific channel characteristics of AANETs are taken
into account in our design. Explicitly, the strong LoS
propagation improves Eve’s detection performance, who
also benefits from intercepting multiple copies of the
signal during multi-hop relaying. As a compelling benefit
of the proposed scheme, eavesdroppers cannot extract the
confidential information, since they do not know the CQI
of the desired link. This guarantees secure communica-
tions in AANETs, despite its strong LoS propagation and
its multi-hop nature.
• The performance of our CQI-mapped SM-SCMA is eval-
uated in terms of its bit error rate (BER), ergodic data
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rate, ergodic secrecy rate and detection complexity within
the multi-hop AANETs. Our numerical results substan-
tiate the benefits of the proposed scheme in achieving
a high throughput, while simultaneously enhancing the
PLS of the AANETs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Firstly,
Section II proposes the CQI-mapped SM-SCMA for enhancing
both the throughput and the PLS of AANETs. A turbo-coded
system is presented. Subsequently, Section III presents the
signal detection and decoding at both the desired receiver and
the third parties. To evaluate performance of our proposed
scheme in multi-hop AANETs, its secrecy rate is formulated
in Section IV, followed by our simulation results characterizing
both the BER and ergodic secrecy rate in Section V. Finally,
this paper is concluded in Section VI.
Notations: Matrices and vectors are denoted by boldface
uppercase and lowercase letters, respectively. In particular,
0M×1 denotes the M × 1 zero vector and IM denotes the
M×M identity matrix. The transpose, the conjugate transpose
and the modulus operators are denoted by (·)T, (·)† and
‖ · ‖, respectively. Moreover, E{·} represents the expectation
(mean) operator, and the conditional probability density func-
tion (PDF) of a random variable x given the event of y = A
is denoted by p(x|y = A).
II. SYSTEM MODEL




Fig. 1. A multi-hop channel in AANET.
Let us consider an AANET supporting a group of aero-
planes, as shown in Fig. 1, where a reciprocal link can be set
up between any two of them and the routing from a source
aeroplane to its destination hinges on the trade-off between
link quality and latency. The relative velocity between the
transmitter and the receiver in a reciprocal link is stable and
quite low in comparison to the absolute velocity of aircraft,
which results in a low Doppler shift. To boost the resource
utilisation efficiency, the A2A communications adopt the TDD
mode, which facilitates for multiple aeroplanes to access a
shared spectral band and no wasteful guard bands are needed.
Moreover, the TDD mode allows the aeroplanes to know each
other’s CSI without feedback channel.
The channel statistics of the AANET are composed of
the signal attenuation with phase variation, the Doppler shift
and the multipath effects during wave propagation. Explicitly,
the channels in A2A communications are Rician-distributed,
consisting of the LoS and the scattered components. The ratio
of the LoS path power to the scattered power is defined as the
Rician factor κ = σ2LoS/σ
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LoS path power and the scattered power generated by Clarke’s
model, respectively. Specifically, the power normalization re-
quires σ2LoS + σ
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The channel characteristics in different phases of the aircraft
flight, i.e., parking, taxiing, takeoff, en-route, holding, and
landing, are specified in [1] and [5]. In practice, A2A com-
munications are typically relied upon in the en-route phase,
with the channel characteristics in terms of aircraft velocity v,
typical Rician factor κ, maximum Doppler frequency fd and
maximum normalized Doppler frequency f̄d listed in Table II.
As shown in Table II, we adopt the Type-1 L-band Digi-
tal Aeronautical Communications System (L-DACS1) frame-
work, which offers data services under the LTE standards
[43]. The various aircraft velocities, v ∈ [17, 620] m/s, result
in Doppler shift of fd ∈ [0.056, 2.07] kHz, calculated by
fd = vfc/c, where c = 3× 108 m/s is the speed of light and
fc = 1 GHz is the carrier frequency employed in L-DACS1.
This results in the maximum normalized Doppler shifts of
f̄d ∈ [0.896× 10−4, 33.1× 10−4], calculated by f̄d = fd/fs,
where fs = 625 kHz is the Baud rate of the L-DACS1 [43].
Given the aircraft velocity v  c, the Doppler shift in an
A2A link can be calculated using ∆f = ∆v · fc/c, where ∆v
is the relative velocity between the transmitter and the receiver.
In practice, ∆v within an A2A link is controllable. Assuming
that ∆v follows a normal distribution with the mean of 30 m/s
and a certain variance less than 30 m/s, the mean Doppler shift
is 0.1 kHz in this A2A link. If the mean of ∆v is predictable,
the Doppler shift contributed by it can be compensated through
a frequency pre-shift at the transmitter. As such, the Doppler
spread results from the variational components of ∆v and
the scattered multipath components, which means that the
minimum coherence time is 10 ms. Therefore, when the TDD
mode is employed, the minimum duration of a single time slot
is 5 ms.
For the multi-hop AANET portrayed in Fig. 1, we assume
that the information exchange between Aeroplanes A and E is
routed via B, C, and D, hence forming the trajectory of A-B-
C-D-E, given the link quality and latency table of the relevant
moment. However, when Aeroplane A transmits its signal to
Aeroplane B, the other nearby aeroplanes in this AANET can
detect and decode the signals forwarded in this path, which
will result in security threats.
B. CQI-mapped SM-SCMA
Now we consider A2A communications over a single hop in
the AANET. The system model of the proposed CQI-mapped
turbo-encoded SM-SCMA over the t-th (t = 1, 2, · · · , T ) hop
in a routed path within the AANET is illustrated in Fig. 2,
where an eavesdropper attempts to extract the confidential
information delivered via this link. The transmitter has M
TAs and employs R subcarriers. There are N receive antennas
(RAs) and NE RAs at the eavesdropper. The rth subcarrier
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TABLE II
CHANNEL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE A2A COMMUNICATIONS IN THE EN-ROUTE PHASE.
Characteristics κ (dB) v (m/s) fd (kHz) f̄d (×10−4)
L-DACS1 [43]
Range 2 - 20 17 - 620 0.056 - 2.07 0.896 - 33.1


























Fig. 2. The CQI-mapped SM-SCMA with turbo encoding for the lth data stream delivered over a hop in the AANET.
channels spanning from the transmitter to the receiver and
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where the N × 1 vector h(r)m = [h(r)1m, h
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contains the channel coefficients from the mth TA to all
RAs, and the NE × 1 vector g(r)m = [g(r)1m, g
(r)




contains the channel coefficients from the mth TA to all
RAs of the eavesdropper, in the rth subcarrier over this hop,
m = 1, 2, · · · ,M , n = 1, 2, · · · , NE, r = 1, 2, · · · , R.
Within the AANET, the Rician channel vectors h(r)m and
g
(r)




















respectively, where the LoS paths eN×1 and eNE×1 are all-
one vectors. The N × 1 vector h̃(r)m ∼ CN (0N×1, IN ) and
the NE × 1 vector g̃(r)m ∼ CN (0NE×1, INE) contain i.i.d.
complex Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and unit
variance in the scattered components.
In this hop, the CQI from the mth TA to all RAs in the





m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, r = 1, 2, · · · , R; thus, the CQI pattern
in this subcarrier is given by the permutation containing all
γ
(r)
m , i.e., m = 1, 2, · · · ,M , in descending or ascending order.
For example, in the case of M = 2, there are two CQI
patterns for each subcarrier, i.e., Pattern 1 is γ(r)1 > γ
(r)
2
and Pattern 2 is γ(r)2 > γ
(r)
1 . In the case of M = 4, there


















so on. From an ergodic view point, the total number of CQI
patterns in each subcarrier is P = M ! and each pattern occurs
at the same probability.
To improve the throughput, SCMA is employed to deliver
L data streams simultaneously over R orthogonal subcarriers
(L > R), and SM is utilised to activate a specific TA by a
fraction of the information bits.
For the sake of improving the PLS, the transmitter exploits
our CQI-mapped SM-SCMA to form its SM and SCMA map-
ping patterns according to the instantaneous CQI pattern of
the desired link Hr, which is equivalent to generating a secret
physical-layer key via the CQI pattern in this hop [25]. In
contrast to precoding or jamming, the bit-to-symbol mapping
patterns in SM-SCMA are determined by the CQI pattern in
Hr for each instant or channel use, which does not require any
extra transmit power for precoding or artificial noise. Thanks
to the channel reciprocity of the TDD mode, no feedback
channel is needed to deliver the CQI and, therefore, only the
transmitter and the desired receiver of this hop know the CQI
pattern as well as the SM and SCMA mapping patterns of
each channel use. All the other aeroplanes within the AANET
and all the outside eavesdroppers have no information on
this secret key; thus they will fail to detect the information
conveyed in this hop, since they do not have the correct bit-to-
symbol mapping patterns to decode their received SM-SCMA
signals.
The delivery of the lth data stream, l = 1, 2, · · · , L, at the
transmitter is shown in Fig. 2, where the A-length data stream
ul is firstly turbo-encoded into a E-length coded bit sequence
b̄l, giving a coding rate of E/A.
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After interleaving the coded bit sequence, the inter-





l , · · ·x
(F )
l , and then mapped onto F SM-SCMA sym-
bols. Since these symbols are formed by the same SM-SCMA
mapping pattern, in the following we omit the superscript (f),
f = 1, 2, · · · , F , unless it is required. A bit group xl is split





where x(l)a and x
(l)
d are the log2M bits mapped onto the
TA indices and the log2K radiated bits mapped onto clas-
sic amplitude/phase-modulation (APM) symbols, respectively.
The number of TA-selection patterns is equal to the number
of CQI patterns in a subcarrier, P = M !, and the number
of APM mapping patterns is Q = K!, where K is the APM
order. More specifically, for a R × L SCMA supporting L
data streams by R orthogonal subcarriers, the lth data stream
will be mapped to one of its Q SCMA codebook patterns,
according to the CQI of H and will be transmitted by the
dl  R orthogonal subcarriers that are pre-assigned to the lth
data stream. An example of the subcarrier assignment matrix
C of the 4 × 6 SCMA supporting L = 6 data streams using
R = 4 subcarriers can be expressed as
C =

1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1
 . (4)
In this example, there are 2 orthogonal subcarriers assigned
to a single data stream, i.e., dl = 2, and the number of data
streams sharing the same subcarrier is dr = 3.
During an arbitrary transmission, if the pth CQI pattern oc-
curs in the hop-channel H, the transmitter will exploit the pth
TA-selection pattern, denoted by T(l)p (·), p ∈ {1, 2, · · · , P},
and the qth SCMA mapping pattern for the lth data stream
conveyed by the rth subcarrier, denoted by M(l,r)q (·), q ∈
{1, 2, · · · , Q}. An instance of the 4× 6 SM-SCMA mapping
patterns varying with the CQI pattern for the first data stream
is illustrated in Fig. 3, where the transmitter has M = 2 TAs
with K = 4 for SCMA and there are P = 2 CQI patterns
for each subcarrier. With the SCMA characterized by (4), the
first data stream is delivered through Subcarriers 1 and 2. If
Pattern 1, γ(r)1 > γ
(r)
2 , occurs in Subcarrier r (r = 1, 2), the
SM-SCMA mapping patterns are given by Fig. 3 (a), where
bit 0 is mapped by TA 1 and bit 1 is mapped by TA 2, denoted
by TA 1 ↔ 0 and TA 2 ↔ 1. If Pattern 2, γ(r)1 < γ
(r)
2 , occurs
in Subcarrier r, the SM-SCMA mapping patterns are given by
Fig. 3 (b).
Hence, the N × 1 baseband signals at the rth subcarrier
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contains the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) components. The subscript T(l)p (x
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(b) γ(r)1 < γ
(r)
2
Fig. 3. An example of the 4× 6 SM-SCMA mapping patterns for the first
data stream at Subcarriers 1 and 2 (r = 1, 2), where the number of TAs,
M = 2, and the APM order K = 4.








contains the channel coefficients from the activated
TA of the transmitter to the receiver at the rth subcarrier.
Moreover, M(l,r)q (x
(l)
d ) is the SCMA symbol in the l
th data
stream transmitted over the rth subcarrier, which is mapped by
x
(l)
d according to the q
th SCMA mapping pattern, M(l,r)q (·). To
improve the SM performance in Rician channels, we impose
a phase rotation on the 4 × 6 SCMA symbols to distinguish
the different TAs [44], i.e., θm = 2π(m − 1)/(3MR), m =






is the phase rotation
of the TA T(l)p (x
(l)
a ).
Similarly, the baseband signals at the rth subcarrier received
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contain the eavesdropper’s received signals and the AWGN
components, respectively.
III. SIGNAL DETECTION
In this section, the detection of CQI-mapped SM-SCMA
signals are presented for both the desired receiver and the
third party to quantify the PLS of AANETs with our proposed
scheme from the decoding perspective. Since the length of
TDD frames is designed in terms of the channel’s coherence
time, as stated in Section II-A, the CSI is assumed herein to
be perfectly known both at the desired receiver and at the
eavesdroppers.
A. Desired Receiver
The channel’s reciprocity of the TDD mode allows the
desired receiver at any hop to always exploit the instantaneous
CQI pattern in this hop. Hence, the SM and SCMA mapping
patterns are always known to the desired receiver at any hop
in the AANET.
The desired receiver’s detection relies on the message
passing algorithm (MPA) proposed in [31]. Explicitly, the
MPA detection exploits the information propagating via the
connections between the L data streams and the R subcarriers,
which can be visualized by a factor graph, comprising L
variable nodes (VNs) and R check nodes (CNs), as exemplified
in Fig. 4, where we have R = 4, L = 6, dl = 2 and dr = 3.





Fig. 4. An example of the factor graph of the proposed SM-SCMA scheme
with the parameters R = 4, L = 6, dl = 2 and dr = 3.
Before detailing the MPA detection, we first define the
connections to VN l and those to CN r in the factor graph
into two sets, which can be respectively expressed as
Vl = {r : 1 6 r 6 R, εl,r 6= 0} , l = 1, · · · , L, (7)
Cr = {l : 1 6 l 6 L, εl,r 6= 0} , r = 1, · · · , R. (8)




a )|M(l,r)q (x(l)d )] is defined
as the information conveyed from CN r to VN l during the ith
iteration of the MPA detection, which represents the likelihood
of w = T(l)p (x
(l)
a )|M(l,r)q (x(l)d ), given all likelihoods received
by CN r from all connected VNs [r] excluding VN l, namely
[r]\l ∈ {Cr\l} with ‘\’ denoting the exclusion operation. By
contrast, the likelihood forwarded from VN l to CN r in the ith
iteration is defined as η(w,i)l→r , which represents the probability
of w = T(l)p (x
(l)
a )|M(l,r)q (x(l)d ) given the probabilities received
by VN l from all connected CNs [l] excluding CN r, i.e.,
[l]\r ∈ {Vl\r}. Then the MPA detection operates in the
following steps:
1) Initialisation: Given the equiprobable transmission of
all SM-SCMA symbols, η(w,0)l→r is initialised to 1/(MK) for
any εl,r 6= 0 and for all w = T(l)p (x(l)a )|M(l,r)q (x(l)d ) ∈
S
(l,r)
p,q (·), where S(l,r)p,q (·) , T(l)p (·)⊗M(l,r)q (·) represents the
combination the pth SM mapping pattern and the qth SCMA
mapping pattern for the lth data stream, with ⊗ denoting the
Kronecker product.
2) VN update: At the ith iteration, the information conveyed



















l′→r is the product of the probabilities
propagated to CN r from all connected VNs excluding VN l,
i.e., the a priori probability of a given x[r]\x(l) with w = x(l
′),
and S(Cr\l,r)(·) represents the SM-SCMA mapping patterns
of the data streams that are connected to the rth subcarrier
excluding the lth data stream. The conditional PDF of the rth























q (·) is the APM signal mapped by the qth
SCMA mapping pattern of data stream l′ at the rth subcarrier.
3) CN update: At the (i+ 1)th iteration, δ(w,i)r→l obtained in














4) Log-Likelihood Ratio (LLR) Conversion: Once the pre-
determined number of iterations, I , is reached, the symbol
probability η(w,I)l of the l
th data stream according to the










As a result, the symbol probability η(w,I)l is converted to a
posteriori bit LLRs given by












where b̂(l)v is the vth bit of the detected SM-SCMA symbol
in the lth data stream, w ∈ S(l,r)p,q (·). Then, the extrinsic
information of b̂(l)v is obtained by
Le,MPA(b̂(l)v ) =L




























is the a priori LLR of b̂(l)v . Given the equiprobable transmis-
sion of Bit 0 and Bit 1, we have p(b̂(l)v = 0) = p(b̂
(l)
v = 1)
and La,MPA(b̂(l)v ) = 0.
After the MPA detection of all F SM-SCMA symbols,
i.e., the bit groups x(1)l ,x
(2)
l , · · ·x
(F )
l , the extrinsic bit LLRs
Le,MPA(b̂
(l,f)
v ) of the lth data stream, ∀f = 1, 2, · · · , F , v =
1, 2, · · · , A/F , are entered into the turbo decoder after the
de-interleaver for performing Log-BCJR turbo decoding at the
desired receiver [45]. The decoded LLRs are then forwarded
to the next hop.
In practice, there are two relaying schemes available within
the multi-hop AANET, given T hops in total. One is the detect-
and-forward scheme, where the transmitter in an intermediate
hop, t ∈ {1, · · · , T − 1}, detects its received signal in the
(t − 1)th hop and then transmits its detected signal. Herein,
only the destination aeroplane performs the MPA detection
followed by Log-BCJR decoding to obtain the original infor-
mation of the source aeroplane. Another relaying scheme is the
detect & decode-and-forward, where every transmitter in an
intermediate hop has to perform MPA detection followed by
Log-BCJR decoding based on its received signal in the former
hop before forwarding the information bits it has decoded.
B. Undesired Receivers or Eavesdroppers
As shown in Fig. 2, the eavesdropper (Eve) attempts to
detect the information delivered in a hop of the AANET, based
on her received signal y(r)E given in (6).
Eve may perform the same MPA detection followed by Log-
BCJR turbo decoding as the desired receiver does in Subsec-
tion III-A. However, since Eve does not know the CQI of the
desired link, she cannot access the SM-SCMA mapping pattern
S
(l,r)
p,q (·) used by the transmitter of the moment. Therefore,





E (·) on her own for each data stream, and uses this pattern
to perform MPA detection for obtaining the detected symbol




d ) ∈ S
(l,r)
E (·),
where T(l)E (·) and M
(l,r)
E (·) are Eve’s selected SM and SCMA
mapping patterns for the lth data stream conveyed by the rth
subcarrier, respectively.
Therefore, even if Eve adopts the brute-force approach to
search all PQ SM-SCMA mapping patterns, she has no basis
for picking up the correct one used in the desired link and
only has an equal probability of 1/(PQ) to guess the secret
key. This ensures that the confidential information delivered
through the route in the AANET is protected from the attacks
of third parties. Note that even if multiple eavesdroppers exist,
each individual eavesdropper detects the received signal based
on the CQI she obtained and still has a probability of 1/PQ
to successfully select the correct secrete key.
IV. SECRECY RATE IN AANET
In this section, we analyse the secrecy rate achieved by
the CQI-mapped SM-SCMA scheme in multi-hop AANETs,
which is defined as the positive difference between the
achievable data rates obtained by the legitimate link and the
wiretapping link, given finite-alphabet channel inputs.
As the 4 × 6 sparse spreading codebook of [46] is used,
there are 3 data streams conveyed by each subcarrier. In each
hop associated with a given channel realisation, the overall
achievable data rate of the 6 streams conveyed by 4 subcarriers
over the desired link with the inputs illustrated in Fig. 3 is









































) pertains to the rth subcarrier associated with the
transmitted signals s(r)ki , s
(r)
k′i







i) 6= (mi, ki) excludes the event when m′i = mi
and k′i = ki occur together from the summation, i = 1, 2, 3.
Moreover, ρ = 1/σ2Z is the unit-energy signal-to-noise power
ratio (SNR), and Ez{·} represents the expectation with respect
to the AWGN received by the desired receiver within the rth
subcarrier, i.e. zr.
Apparently, as ρ tends to infinity, we have the achievable




CD(ρ) = 6 log2(MK). (17)
This gives the upper bound on the data rate of each hop with
M TAs and K APM constellation points adopted by a SM-
SCMA transmitter in the AANET simultaneously transmitting
6 data streams. For example, when we have M = 4 transmit
antennas (TAs) and each of the L = 6 data streams adopts
K = 4-ary APM, we have a maximum data rate of 24
bits/sec/Hz.
On the other hand, the eavesdropper does not know the SM-
SCMA mapping patterns in the desired link. Therefore, the












where 1M indicates the right TA mapping patterns among
the M candidates for Eve, while 1K3 represents the correct
mapping pattern among the K3 available ones. Additionally, in
(18), CEa and CEd denote the achievable data rates of the TA
index bits x(l)a and the classic radiated bits x
(l)
d of the l
th data
stream accessing Eve, respectively, if Eve could successfully
decode them [25]. The expressions of CEa and CEd are
given in (19) and (20), respectively. Therein, the NE × 1

































































































































































































































































































































3 }, for ki, k′i = 1, 2, · · · ,K, mi,m′i =
1, 2, · · · ,M , i = 1, 2, 3. Moreover, Ez{·} stands for the
expectation with respect to the AWGN received by Eve in
the rth subcarrier, i.e., z(r)E .





CEd(ρ) = log2K. As ρ goes to infinity,












For the AANET with T hops, the achievable end-to-end







where CD,t is the overall data rate of the CQI-mapped SM-
SCMA in the tth hop, calculated through (16) using the
channel realisation in the tth hop of the routed path.




CD,1, CD,2, · · · , CD,t−1, C(t)E
)
, (23)
where C(t)E is calculated through (18) using Eve’s channel
realisation in the tth hop.






where CE,t is given by (23).
Now we can have the expression of the secrecy rate of a
wiretap channel, which is the positive difference between the
achievable data rates obtained by the legitimate link and the
wiretapping link, i.e., if the legitimate link is better than the
wiretapping link. For a T -hop AANET relying on our CQI-
mapped SM-SCMA under study, the instantaneous secrecy rate
is obtained by





where R(T )D and R
(T )
E are given by (22), and (24), respectively.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN AANET
In this section, the security performance of the CQI-mapped
SM-SCMA is evaluated within a multi-hop AANET, in terms
of its BER in Section V-A and its ergodic secrecy rate in
Section V-B. In the simulations, we employ the example
parameters summarized in Table II for the AANET, where
a Rician fading factor of κ = 15 dB is considered and the
relative velocity between the transmitter and the receiver is 30
m/s.
A. BER Performance
To begin with, the end-to-end BER performance of the
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(b) M = N = NE = 4
Fig. 5. Uncoded BER performance of the T = 1, 2, 4, 8-hop AANET with
a Rician fading factor of κ = 15 dB, where the CQI-mapped SM-SCMA
employs R = 4 orthogonal subcarriers to support L = 6 data streams in the
scenarios: (a) M = N = NE = 2, and (b) M = N = NE = 4, where the
CQI-mapped SCMA and CQI-mapped MIMO-SCMA schemes are included
as the benchmarks of our proposed CQI-mapped SM-SCMA.
demonstrate the uncoded and coded performance of the CQI-
mapped SM-SCMA in multi-hop AANETs.
Figs. 5 (a) and (b) show the uncoded BER performance in
the single-hop (T = 1) and mulit-hop (T = 2, 4, 8) AANET
employing M = N = 2 and M = N = 4 TAs, respectively,
where the number of antennas at Eve is NE = 2 and NE = 4
as well. Given that a multi-hop AANET is considered, the
number of RAs, N , is equal to that of the TAs, M , in each
hop. Because the detect-and-forward technique is employed,
the BER performance of the routed path degrades, as the
number of hops increases. Specifically, a 2dB SNR loss can
be observed from Fig. 5 (b) at the BER of 10−5, when the
number of hops in a AANET increases from T = 1 to T = 8.
By contrast, since Eve cannot gain access to the CQI pattern of
the desired link in any hop, she is unable to identify the SM-
SCMA mapping patterns activated by the secret key. Hence,
Eve cannot detect the confidential information delivered over
the routed path, relying on the MPA detection.
Additionally, by comparing Figs. 5 (a) and (b), we find that
the BER performance of the routed path using M = N = 4
is around 1dB better than that of M = N = 2. This offers the
insight that the tradeoff between the BER performance and the
multi-antenna configuration cost has to be carefully considered
in the practical design of AANETs. Moreover, the variance of









which is doubled when the number of RAs increases from
N = 2 to N = 4, in any hop. From the PLS perspective of our
CQI-mapped design, increasing the number of TAs, M , allows
us to reduce the number of pilot symbols required for the high-
probability identification of the active CQI pattern, mainly
because the CQI falls within different confidence intervals at a
similar probability. As such, the tradeoff between the resource
utilisation efficiency and the multi-antenna configuration cost
has to be taken into account for practical AANET designs.
Figs. 6 (a) and (b) further investigate the coded BER
performance using the same parameters as Figs. 5 (a) and
(b), respectively, where 1/2-rate turbo coding is employed.
Herein, the detect-and-forward and detect & decode-and-
forward techniques are compared for our multi-hop AANET.
When detect-and-forward relaying is employed, the perfor-
mance is degraded significantly upon increasing the number
of hops, since only the MPA detection of the received signals
is performed in the intermediate hops (t = 1, · · · , T − 1),
while Log-BCJR turbo decoding is only performed in the last
hop, i.e. at the T th hop. For example, it can be observed from
Fig. 6 (a) that doubling T from T = 2 to T = 4 leads to over
1dB performance degradation at a BER of 10−5. By contrast,
when the detect & decode-and-forward relaying is combined
both with MPA detection and Log-BCJR turbo decoding, the
performance loss is mitigated by at least 2.3dB, in the case of a
AANET having T = 2 hops, as shown in Fig. 6 (a). However,
this performance loss mitigation is achieved at the cost of a
much higher computational complexity and latency, since the
decoding cannot start until all the received symbols have been
detected. We also remark that, for a single-hop AANET, there
is no difference between these two approaches, where the MPA
detection and the Log-BCJR turbo decoding are performed at
the receiver, since the signals will not be forwarded.
When it comes to the performance of wiretapping links,
Figs. 5 and 6 reveal that Eve’s BER is always around 0.5,
which implies that she cannot unveil any confidential infor-
mation delivered over the routed path in the AANET relying
on our CQI-mapped SM-SCMA, despite performing MPA
detection and Log-BCJR turbo decoding as well. Hence, A2A
communications in the routed path are secured by the proposed
secret key.
Finally, for demonstrating the benefits of our proposed
scheme, we compare our CQI-mapped SM-SCMA with sev-
eral benchmark systems at the same transmission data rate of 6
bits per subcarrier (bps). Fig. 7 characterizes the uncoded BER
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(b) M = N = NE = 4
Fig. 6. Coded BER performance of the T = 1, 2, 4, 8-hop AANET with
a Rician fading factor of κ = 15 dB, where the 1/2-rate turbo-coded CQI-
mapped SM-SCMA employs R = 4 orthogonal subcarriers to support L = 6
data streams in the scenarios: (a) M = N = NE = 2, and (b) M = N =
NE = 4.
mapped SM-SCMA, SCMA, MIMO-SCMA and SM-OFDM
using N = 4 RAs. As shown in Fig. 7, our CQI-mapped
SM-SCMA employs M = 4 TAs and K = 4-ary APM to
transmit 4 bits by a single data stream. Since each data stream
spreads over dl subcarriers, each subcarrier in the 4× 6 CQI-
mapped SM-SCMA system transmits at 6 bps. By contrast,
since SCMA employs only a single TA, K = 16-ary APM has
to be employed by each data stream, leading to the same rate
of 6 bps, whereas M = 4 MIMO-SCMA only has to transmit
1 bit per TA per data stream. However, when each subcarrier
transmits a single SM modulated symbol, SM-OFDM having
R = 4 subcarriers supports up to L = 4 data streams. This
leads to the choice of M = 4 and K = 16 for SM-OFDM.
We can observe from Fig. 7 that our proposed CQI-mapped
SM-SCMA exhibits the best BER performance among the four
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Fig. 7. Uncoded BER performance of the T = 1-hop AANET with a
Rician fading factor of κ = 15 dB employing CQI-mapped SM-SCMA,
SCMA, MIMO-SCMA and SM-OFDM using N = 4, where the SCMA-
related schemes employ R = 4 orthogonal subcarriers to support L = 6 data
streams.
schemes, achieving at least 1dB SNR gain over MIMO-SCMA
at a BER of 10−5, which demonstrates the benefits of our
design.
B. Ergodic secrecy rate
Next, we characterize the ergodic secrecy rate numerically
based on the analysis of Section IV. Within the AANET, the
desired and wiretapping links are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.), and the channels exhibit frequency-selective
fading, as given in (5) and (6), respectively.
In Fig. 8, the ergodic secrecy rate of a T -hop AANET using
our CQI-mapped SM-SCMA, E{R(T )s }, is plotted for the 4-
point APM input illustrated in Fig. 3, where we have K = 4,
T = 1, 2, 4, 8 and detect & decode-and-forward relaying is
used. For the sake of comparison, the ergodic data rate of
the routed path in the AANET, E{R(T )D }, is also presented.
As shown in this figure, both the data rate of the routed path
and the secrecy rate decreases upon increasing the number
of hops. However, the rate reduction is modest, particularly
in Fig. 8 (b), because detect & decode-and-forward relaying
experiences strong LoS propagation in the AANET, which
mitigates the rate loss over multiple hops.
The ergodic data rate of the routed path in the AANET
converges to 18 bits/sec/Hz in Fig. 8 (a) and 24 bits/sec/Hz in
Fig. 8 (b), which agree with the limit in (17). Moreover, the
ergodic secrecy rate converges to 14.8 bits/sec/Hz in Fig. 8
















That is, the ergodic data rate leaked over the routed path in the
AANET converges to 3.2 bits/sec/Hz for both cases of M = 2
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Fig. 8. Ergodic secrecy rate achieved by the T -hop AANET with CQI-
mapped SM-SCMA of a 4-point APM input, E{R(T )s } for T = 1, 2, 4, 8 in
the scenarios: (a) M = N = NE = 2, and (b) M = N = NE = 4. Also
shown is the ergodic data rate of the routed path in the AANET, E{R(T )D },
in these scenarios.
and M = 4 TAs with K = 4 APM, which agrees with the
limit in (21).
C. Complexity
In this section, we quantify the detection complexity of our
CQI-mapped SM-SCMA scheme when employing the state-
of-the-art MPA detector, as discussed in Section III-A, in terms
of the complexity order and the number of floating point
operations (FLOPs) required by the MPA detector per iteration
[47].
Specifically, when the optimal maximum-likelihood (ML)
detector is adopted, the detector has to visit every possible
TABLE III
THE DETECTION COMPLEXITY OF THE MPA AND ML DETECTION FOR






(2, 2) 2.6× 105 5.2× 105
(4, 4) 3.9× 105 6.7× 107
symbol of all L data streams and each symbol transmitted
by the lth data stream is chosen out of KM candidates from
S
(l,r)
p,q (·), giving a complexity order of O[(KM)L] [31]. By
contrast, the VN update of (9) dominates the complexity order
of the MPA detector. Observe from (9) that the MPA algorithm
deals with only dr data streams sharing a single subcarrier,
hence the number of multiplications is determined by the size
of x[r], which results in a complexity order of O[(KM)dr ].
When the MPA detector is employed for CQI-mapped SCMA
or for CQI-mapped MIMO-SCMA, we have the complexity
orders of O(Kdr ) and O(KMdr ), respectively.
Furthermore, Table III quantifies the number of FLOPs
required by the ML and MPA detector for our SM-SCMA
system using M = N = 2 and M = N = 4, which shows
that in contrast to the high-complexity ML detector, the MPA
detector can be implemented in AANETs at an affordable
complexity. Furthermore, a suite of sophisticated algorithms
have been proposed in the literature [34], [35], which would
further reduce the detection complexity of our proposed CQI-
mapped SM-SCMA scheme.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A CQI-mapped SM-SCMA scheme was conceived for im-
proving the throughput while enhancing the PLS of multi-
hop AANETs, which generates a secret key by activating a
certain SM-SCMA mapping pattern based on the instantaneous
CQI of the desired link in each hop. With this secret key
in the multi-hop AANET, although the eavesdroppers have
the opportunity to get multiple copies of the confidential
messages that are being forwarded via the routed path, they
are still unable to unveil the source information because they
cannot access the CQI of desired links. Thus, they have
no knowledge of the activated SM-SCMA mapping patterns.
Moreover, the MPA detection and turbo coding were used
for further improving the BER performance of the proposed
scheme in the routed path of AANETs. Our BER performance
and the ergodic secrecy rate results have substantiated that
multi-hop AANETs using our proposed schemes, secure the
desired A2A communications at high throughput.
Our future research will investigate other MIMO transmis-
sion approaches based on our CQI-varied mapping approach,
providing promising candidates for future A2A secure com-
munications.
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